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AN “INFORMATION LITERACY” PERSPECTIVE
OF THE CREATION/EVOLUTION
DEBATE
Terry D. Robertson
Andrews University

Introduction
The pedagogical mission of my profession as a librarian is to train in
“information literacy.” Within the context of higher education that is
conceived of generally as instructing a student in using library resources
to complete an academic writing assignment. The Association of College
Research Libraries has identified the broad set of competencies required for
this task, summarized as the ability to define an information need, and find,
evaluate, and then use it ethically.1 Of particular interest is how we mentor the
effective evaluation of information in an information-saturated culture.2
The creation/evolution debate provides an intriguing case study on
the process of evaluating information for the following reason: The two
accounts are mutually exclusive. The information seeker cannot accept both
as true. Often this results in accepting one as true and the other as false.3
And the distinctive accounts highlight the function of standard criteria
generally presented in information literacy training: authority, independent
corroboration, plausibility and support, and presentation.4
This essay will discuss the creation/evolution debate from the perspective
of the novice information seeker, discussing and applying the principles of
Patricia Iannuzzi et al., Information Literacy Competency Standards for Higher Education
(Chicago: Association of College and Research Libraries, 2000).
2
The professional literature on information literacy is vast. Some good overviews
include: John Budd, Framing Library Instruction (Chicago: Association of College and
Research Libraries, 2009); Michael Eisenberg, Carrie A. Lowe, and Kathleen L. Spitzer,
Information Literacy: Essential Skills for the Information Age, 2d ed. (Westport, CT: Libraries
Unlimited, 2004); Ann Grafstein, “A Discipline-Based Approach to Information
Literacy,” Journal of Academic Librarianship 28/4 (2002): 197-204.
3
Delimiting this discussion to the biblical-creation account and the standard
evolutionary account is arbitrary in that virtually all religions and cultures have unique
creation accounts, e.g., each of the ancient cultures of Babylon, Greece, and Egypt
had well-articulated accounts; Native American cultures have their accounts; and so
forth. However, unlike most creation accounts, the two under consideration in this
discussion both make a scientific claim to reality.
4
Don Fallis, “On Verifying the Accuracy of Information: Philosophical
Perspectives,” Library Trends 52/3 (2004): 464-465. This article focuses on the
evaluation of information found on internet web sites, more particularly on the
accuracy of information, e.g., in the case of medical information.
1
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information literacy. Ultimately, it will be suggested that these strategies can
go only so far, and that criteria for accepting one account over the other
will be based on subjective metaphysical presuppositions which find grounds
formed through faith in an authority. It can also be assumed that, given the
social context of this journal, I will argue for the biblical-creation account.
Working Definition of Information
Defining the term “information” has always been problematic because
both the word and concept are used in many ways and in so many different
contexts.5 Thus, for the purposes of this essay, the term will be delimited
to the semantic vehicle by which knowledge is exchanged between two
minds. This supposes a commodified form of communication medium using
symbols that record the knowledge of an informer which can then be accessed
independently by any number of informees.6 The most common information
vehicles pertinent to the religion-and-science debate in the academic context
are books and journals, whether analog or digital.7
A further distinction needs to be made.8 Some information (the
knowledge obtained by an author expressed in a semantically commodified
form) is descriptive. This class of information applies to those facts which
can be verified independently in real time. I as an individual may not be able
to visit the pyramids of Giza, so for information about the pyramids I rely
on pictures and on what other competent authors have written. I am certain
that if I were to travel to Egypt, I would find the pyramids as they have
described them. The location on the map would correspond, as well as any
measurements I might make.
A second class of information (knowledge of an author expressed in
a semantically commodified form) incorporates the further analysis and
interpretation of verifiable descriptive information by the author. In the case
Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 2007). Schiller’s discussion of the capitalistic commodification of information
in a global context highlights many of the challenges the novice information seeker
must take into account, including but not limited to the economic infrastructure that
delivered the information.
6
Albert Bormann, Holding on to Reality: The Nature of Information at the Turn of
the Millennium (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 22. His definition for
information is also multifaceted: “INTELLIGENCE provided, a PERSON is
informed by a SIGN about some THING within a certain CONTEXT.”
7
For a helpful distinction between knowledge and information, see Peter Suber,
“Knowledge as a Public Good,” SPARC Open Access Newsletter, 2 November 2009, n.
130 (http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/newsletter/11-02-09.htm#publicgood).
8
These distinctions reflect the discussion by Luciano Floridi, “Semantic
Conceptions of Information,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/information-semantic).
5
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of the pyramids of Giza, this class of information is illustrated by discussions
of their history, methods of construction, religious significance for the
builders, and so forth. Competent authorities have come to their conclusions
on these matters, not because they were personally present and observed these
events; but from their analysis of historical documents and their awareness
of the social world of the builders, they have made logical inferences that
they believe represent the way things happened. While I might be able to
access some of the same historical documents and artifacts, I must accept
their “interpretation” as simply that, and then decide whether or not they are
justified in their conclusions. This is not a simple, straightforward matter of
independent verification.
When evaluating the first class of information, the information seeker
thinks in categories of accuracy and completeness, and believes it or not
in terms of certainty. As for the second class, categories revolve around
the reliability of the author, both in terms of method and bias, and the
information seeker believes the information or not in terms of confidence.
In other words, this is a theoretical expansion of the distinction between
verifying facts and validating opinions.
While these kinds of distinctions are helpful in theory, actually confronting
theological texts and scientific texts that give an account of human origins is
much more complex. Whether supporting the biblical creation account or
the standard evolutionary account, the authors are expressing their beliefs
using the rhetoric of certainty and the language of factuality. Thus for the
novice information seeker, the normal clues by which she categorizes fact and
opinion may not be self-evident. Also, claims to authority not directly related
to the content but present in the ambient culture may also prove influential in
the evaluation process.9
In terms of the creation/evolution debate, my argument also assumes
that the facts, those which can be observed and measured in real time by
competent individuals, are not at issue.10 That there is a geologic column
evident in the Grand Canyon is equally evident to all geologists, both
creationist and evolutionist. That the fossilized bones found on a southwest
Michigan farm and on display at Andrews University are from an extinct
mammoth is uncontested knowledge for paleontologists. That species have
adapted to their environment through an evolutionary process so that certain
breeds of domesticated cattle that thrive in arid temperate climates do vary

9
As lamented by Gilbert Keith Chesterton: “Modern intelligence won’t accept
anything on authority. But it will accept anything without authority” (The Man Who
Knew Too Much [New York: Harper, 1922], 180).
10
Steve Fuller, “Evidence? What Evidence?” Philosophy of the Social Sciences (http://
pos.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/10/0048393111402778.citation).

162

Seminary Studies 49 (Spring 2011)

significantly from those that thrive in humid tropical climates is common
knowledge for biologists.
My argument is based, however, on the understanding that it is the
inferences and interpretations of such generally accepted facts that has led to
mutually exclusive accounts of human origins.11 It is this phenomenon that
poses a substantive problem for the novice information seeker. But we should
not simply reduce what can be known to the immediately observable, particularly
in the context of this debate. Doing so would leave us with nothing more than
perhaps interesting but rather insignificant trivia. It is also appreciated that the
overarching hope of this debate is that these inferences and interpretations that
take us beyond the facts will contribute to the understanding of the meaning
or purpose of human life.12 And it is also that larger purpose that renders
the epistemic choice between the biblical creation account and the standard
evolutionary account so psychologically compelling.
The Evaluation of Information
In the previous section, I argued for a definition of information as knowledge
of an author expressed in a semantically commodified form. Within this
definition, I distinguished between information that is verifiable in real
time and information that has the added value of authorial inference and
interpretation. In this section, I will discuss the various facets that are
incorporated into the information literacy evaluation process.
Most educated and socially aware persons are tacitly adept at evaluating
everyday informational knowledge exchanges, and so are able, for example,
11
Ibid. “Scientists who wish to embed their findings in more explicitly theoretical
agendas are limited by the peer-review process. This leads ID [Intelligent Design]/
creationists to complain (rightly) of a ‘naturalistic’ philosophical bias that allows
scientific authors to use their articles’ introductions and conclusions to articulate their
findings in terms of broader Neo-Darwinian research themes but not those of ID/
creationism, even though the same findings could be understood in those terms too.
As a result of this asymmetrical treatment at the reviewer stage, ID/creationism is
effectively censored before it can enter the scientific literature—unless ID/creationists
manage to come up with testable hypotheses the success of which could not be
explained equally well in Neo-Darwinian terms.”
12
Roger Smith, Being Human: Historical Knowledge and the Creation of Human Nature
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 240-241. “No one will question the
unparalleled precision of the natural sciences. But knowledge about what makes a
person significant, or an institution just, or a claim to truth persuasive, or a moment
of perception beautiful, has a different character. It requires knowledge of particulars
set in a story. Historically deracinated abstract knowledge, exemplified in the physical
sciences, establishes no meaning, differentiates no shades of significance and points
in no direction relevant to knowing what to do. It is knowledge about particulars, the
place of people and events in a story, which opens such possibilities.”
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to recognize advertising hype or political propaganda for what it is, while also
sifting out what is true and adding it to their own knowledge fund. However,
academic-writing scenarios are not everyday knowledge exchanges, but rather
a specialized and contextualized form. The challenge facing the information
seeker in this setting is that not all information is created equal, and discretion
is needed to select the most reliable sources.
That the engagement of such critical-thinking dispositions is necessary
is based on the observed reality that the human minds that create the
information are by nature limited and constrained in a number of significant
ways, including space, time, language, and expertise. When the information is
incomplete or inaccurate because of limitations imposed on the informer, it
is described as misinformation. Cases are also plentiful in which the informer
intentionally attempts to manipulate the informee for some personal gain; thus
disinformation abounds.13 The burden of recognizing these counter-informing
objects falls on the informee, who is also constrained by the same limitations.
But it is the informee that bears the consequences of any misjudgment.14
Key criteria have been outlined for evaluating information and providing
the novice with some initial guidance. These include verifying the authority of
the source, seeking independent corroboration of factual claims, reviewing
the plausibility and support for the propositions, and observing the clues
embedded in the presentation of the information. It is also assumed that
using these reliable methods to evaluate information will produce reliable
results. A corollary to this thesis is that reliable sources are more likely to
provide reliable information.15
However, in spite of the general success that these methods offer for
recognizing good information, two cautions are in order. The first has been
labeled the “information cascade.”16 In this scenario, a proposition has been
13
Bernd Carsten Stahl, “On the Difference or Equality of Information,
Misinformation, and Disinformation: A Critical Research Perspective,” Informing Science
Journal 9 (2006): 83-96.

Fallis, 464-466.
John M. Budd, “Academic Libraries and Knowledge: A Social Epistemology
Framework,” Journal of Academic Librarianship 30/5 (2004): 365-366. Budd is arguing
that the library should take an active role rather than a passive role in both their
instructional and collection development capacities when helping information seekers
find accurate and reliable information.
16
Originally coined and described in Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer,
and Ivo Welch, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as
Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy 100/5 (1992): 992-1026. For
summary and updated bibliography, see Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and
Ivo Welch, “Information Cascades and Rational Herding: An Annotated Bibliography
and Resource Reference,” Working Paper: UCLA/Anderson and Ohio State University
and Yale/SOM (http://www.info-cascades.info).
14
15
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accepted as true because it seems reliable, though it is false, and spreads
throughout a generally reliable academic discipline through standard citation
practices. Thus the false proposition appears to have authority, independent
corroboration, and plenty of disciplinary support with what appears to be
a competent presentation. One classic example is the claim that Eskimos
have many words for snow, and the assertion coheres well with the general
appreciation for the effect of environment on language. The assertion was
accepted as true by many in academic circles until it was tested and proved
false.17 Another long-accepted example is found in the claim that there are
parallels to the story of Job in the Hindu literature. When the citation evidence
was traced back to its source, the claim was proven unwarranted.18
A second caution concerns epistemic circularity, in which a claim is
supported only by reference to authority, plausibility, or presentation, and
not by mind-independent reference to fact. In the courtroom, this class of
information is usually rejected as hearsay. In other words, “one seeks to
defend or demonstrate the reliability of a source in ways that require relying
on beliefs generated by that source.”19 Critics of religion have long made this
case for religious beliefs.20
Epistemology of Testimony
Because there are no eyewitnesses of human origins, and because the origin
event(s) cannot be replicated, we must infer how it happened based on possibly
related real-time observations of phenomena and processes. Such inference
leads a person to belief, and hence to knowledge. When that knowledge is
communicated anew, the added content of interpretation and inference to the
description of the original basic facts takes on the characteristics of testimony.

Laura Martin, “‘Eskimo Words for Snow’: A Case Study in the Genesis and Decay
of an Anthropological Example,” American Anthropologist 88/2 (1986): 418-423.
18
D. J. A. Clines, “In Search of the Indian Job,” VT 33/4 (1983): 398-418.
19
Ralph Baergen, Historical Dictionary of Epistemology, Historical Dictionaries of
Religions, Philosophies, and Movements, 70 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006), 65.
20
William P. Alston, “Knowledge of God,” in Faith, Reason, and Skepticism: Essays,
ed. Marcus B. Hester (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 43-44. The paper
critiques an internalist version of epistemology in which a belief can supposedly be
justified in a noncircular reflective fashion, in which Alston argues little if anything
can then be known. The context of the article is a response to skeptics who claim
knowledge of God cannot be justified. “Its externalist competitor has much more
going for it as a general orientation in epistemology, and it opens up possibilities for
knowledge of God that are closed to internalism. The price of this, however, is a
renunciation of the aim at a noncircular demonstration of the reliability of our sources
of knowledge and an abandonment of hopes for the autonomy of epistemology.”
17
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The evaluation of this enriched class of information can be instructed by
recent work in the epistemology of testimony.21
That most of our knowledge has been gained from testimony is commonly
noted. The simple human limitation of being able to inhabit only one unit
of space and only one moment at a time in a linear sequence restricts our
opportunities to form knowledge from only perception and memory. Relying
on the testimony of others expands our intellectual horizons and empowers
us to efficiently contribute to the collective knowledge of the community.
There are two main schools of thought as to the epistemic value of
testimony in belief formation. Reductionists, following David Hume, require
that testimony must have independent corroboration before it can be used
to justify new belief. Antireductionists, following Thomas Reid, claim that
testimony can be used to justify new belief without positive corroboration in
the absence of evidence to the contrary.22 In the course of the debate between
the two positions, many examples and counterexamples demonstrate the
insufficiency of unilaterally adopting either position. Jennifer Lackey argues
that the reductionist position best describes the epistemic duty of the hearer in
that she must assess the reliability of the source, and that the antireductionist
position describes the epistemic effort of the speaker, whose objective is to
present a rational argument. Thus the communication exchange of information
between two minds is a dualism. It follows that if the speaker is first successful
in rationally justifying a claim through corroboration with factual knowledge,
then the hearer can subsequently accept the claim as reliable without further
epistemic work, since such further corroboration would be redundant.23
Applied to academia, “information literacy” encompasses both the
evaluation of information by an information seeker, which includes the
epistemic task of incorporating new information into her knowledge base.
The seeker is first a “hearer” and, by predetermining which are trustworthy
sources, can accept the information provided as valid unless there are obvious
reasons for rejecting the information as such. The informee/hearer in turn is
expected to give expression to that newly acquired knowledge by authoring
a new unique commodified information product. In authoring this new
product, the informee/hearer becomes an informer/speaker and must adhere
21
In addition to many articles, the following books provide a representative study
of the epistemology of testimony: C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992); S. Goldberg, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language,
Knowledge and Justification (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); A. I. Goldman,
Knowledge in a Social World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); J. Lackey and
E. Sosa, eds., The Epistemology of Testimony (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006);
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology, Modern European
Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
22
Baergen, 210-211.
23
Lackey, 177.
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to the epistemic responsibility of providing validated information for the
intended audience, a new information seeker. Lackey’s dualism is pertinent for
understanding the information-literacy cycle because the informee/informer
incorporates both reductionist and antireductionist epistemic work in this new
commodified information product. This line of argument highlights the social
aspect of knowledge acquisition. Thus, the student author is expected to use
trustworthy sources, and then provide trustworthy information in her written
work, which, in turn, becomes an information source for a subsequent seeker.
Here is the crux of the problem facing a novice information seeker in a query
about human origins. Both the biblical creation and the standard evolutionary
accounts reflect interpretations of factual data, i.e., the objective, measurable
phenomenon observed and recorded by multiple independent and competent
persons in real time. Both accounts are supported by socially recognized and
generally reliable communities following apparently sound methodological
standards. Neither can claim the certainty of formal documented historical
human eyewitnesses. Particularly in the case of geology, the inferences are
drawn from relatively scanty and ambiguous data for which multiple plausible
interpretations are inevitable.24 Both could just as easily be cited by their
critics as an example of information cascading, or could be demonstrated to
be nothing more than a vicious testimonial circle. Scientists who hold to the
biblical creation account are just as rigorous and thorough with the objective
observable data as are scientists who hold to the standard evolutionary account.
Criteria that normally would provide clues in the evaluation of this class of
testimonial information do not provide conclusive answers.
One further contingency comes into play in the creation/evolution
debate. Because of the socially constructed nature of the rhetoric, how a
person evaluates a given proposition in the debate is based less on the
potential truthfulness of the argument and more on what fits the worldview
of the information seeker. Thus what generally happens is that a novice
information seeker, who has been immersed in the standard evolutionary
account throughout elementary and secondary education, and without social
intervention from home and a faith community, will find the evidential claims
supporting evolution more compelling. On the other hand, one who has
been educated in a social context, whether family or church, that assumes the
biblical creation account will find the evidence supporting that account more
Henry N. Pollack, Uncertain Science . . . Uncertain World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), 149. “Dealing with uncertainty about the past is a way of life
with geologists, who in their work of reconstructing natural history are always working
with half a deck or less. Nature is not a mindful conservator, and the inevitable
consequence of time is that the record of what happened long ago becomes degraded
and fragmentary. In their efforts to understand and interpret incomplete information,
geologists always work with a handful of provisional scenarios relevant to explaining
their observations.”
24
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compelling. This tendency reflects both the contextually formed worldview
and prior knowledge of the informee.25 How the informee then handles the
ambiguities and knowledge gaps within the diverse accounts is indicative
of her critical thinking dispositions, which are, again, open to critique and
evaluation by observers who have their own commitments.
C. S. Lewis illustrated the interplay of worldview, prior knowledge, and
logic in the task of evaluating testimony in The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe.
After Lucy’s second visit to Narnia with her brother Edmund, their older
siblings brought the younger two to discuss their tale with the old Professor.
Lucy’s claim did not fit their worldview, while Edmund’s did, thus the concern.
After reviewing the particulars, in which Lucy claimed the events as true, and
Edmund claimed Lucy’s account was false and that they were just pretending,
the Professor asks the pertinent question:
“For instance—if you will excuse me for asking the question—does your
experience lead you to regard your brother or your sister as the more
reliable? I mean, which is the more truthful?”
“That’s just the funny thing about it, sir,” said Peter. “Up till now, I’d have
said Lucy every time.”

The anxiety they were feeling was created by the dissonance between
their worldview and the cumulative prior knowledge based on experience.
After some further discussion about another possibility, the Professor directs
the conversation to critical-thinking dispositions for an answer.
“Logic!” said the Professor half to himself. “Why don’t they teach logic at
these schools? There are only three possibilities. Either your sister is telling
lies, or she is mad, or she is telling the truth. You know she doesn’t tell lies
and it is obvious that she is not mad. For the moment then and unless any
further evidence turns up, we must assume she is telling the truth.”26
25
Michael Polanyi states: “All practical teaching, the teaching of comprehension in
all the senses of the term, is based on authority. The student must be confident that his
master understands what he is trying to teach him and that he, the student, will eventually
succeed in his turn to understand the meaning of the things which are being explained
to him” (“Faith and Reason,” JR 41/4 [1961]: 243). Lesslie Newbigin notes that “Reason
is not an independent means for finding out what is the case. It is not a substitute for
information. In order to be informed, we have to make acts of trust in the traditions we
have inherited and in the evidence of our senses. Moreover, . . . all systematic reasoning
has to begin by taking for granted certain things that are accepted without argument.
There must be data without argument or, at least, without prior demonstration. . . .
There exists no neutral reason that can decide impartially on the truth or falsehood of
the Christian gospel. On the contrary, if it is true that Jesus is the Word made flesh, then
to know Jesus must be the basis of all true knowledge” (Proper Confidence: Faith, Doubt, and
Certainty in Christian Discipleship [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995], 96).
26
Clive Stapleton Lewis, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 2000), 47-48.
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To summarize, the case study of applying information-literacy practices
to the creation/evolution debate has not provided any decisive conclusions.
The only difference between the two accounts seems to be the rhetoric
of invention arising out of differing worldviews.27 Unless there is a way to
critique these distinctive worldviews, then the only conclusion is that the two
accounts are equally valid. Except that intuitive logic cannot accept that being
the case.28 Whereas they may both be false, only one can be true.
Biblical Creation
Account

Standard Evolutionary
Account

Authority

Eyewitness account of
the Creator, as reported
in texts and accepted for
millennia as authoritative
by Jews and Christians.

The general reputation of science,
as defined by scientism, which
purports to provide answers based
on verifiable sense perception.
Responsible for substantive progress
in knowledge and evidenced in
advances in technology and medicine.
Accepted for a couple of centuries,
but recently challenged.

Corroboration

Evidence of intelligent
design and lack
of evidence for
evolutionary crossspeciation.

Geological and paleontological
evidence for long ages. Computer
models using measurable and
verifiable variables.

Plausibility

So claimed by adherents.

So claimed by adherents.

Presentation

Testimonial. The original
text provides a brief
and limited description
of how creation
happened. This account
is a prolegomena to a
narrative of which the
primary purpose was to
establish the identity of
the people of Israel.

Testimonial. The general theory
emerged out of inferences drawn
from new data using assumptions
that questioned “religion” and the
validity of ancient texts.

27
Fuller, 6. Fuller notes that “In short, debates over the scientific probity of ID/
creationism and Neo-Darwinism have little to do with evidence per se but a lot to do
with who speaks for the evidence, which in turn is a matter of permissible explanatory
frameworks in science. In this context, the Popperian phrase, “metaphysical research
program” comes in handy, since the closer one inspects the genuine points of
disagreement between ID/creationism and Neo-Darwinism, the more metaphysical
they become.”
28
Paul A. Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 1-7. He defines the problem of equal validity by
popular media references to Lakota and Zuni human-origin myths, which are justified
as “different ways of knowing.”
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Hebrews 11 as a Biblical Response
Many of the key epistemological problems, as outlined above, were debated in
the Hellenistic world of the first century. New Testament authors addressed
these problems creatively in ways that affirmed the faith of the early church.
For the purposes of this essay, one example will be discussed.
In the book of Hebrews, the author makes the claim: “Now faith is
confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see”29
(11:1). While the context of the book, and, more particularly, the argument that
follows make clear that the “in what”—that which is outside the immediate
field of sense perception and yet to take place—refers to the promises given
by God through the Scriptures and through Jesus Christ,30 I suggest that the
principle invoked could apply to any belief formed on the basis of testimony
apart from perception. Thus I argue that the epistemic status of a belief
formed solely by reliance on testimony is an act of faith.31 In Hebrews, that
act of faith is warranted by the reliability of God as revealed through Jesus
Christ. When applied to the creation/evolution debate, it requires an act of
faith to commit to either account. As further evidenced in Heb 11:3, “By faith
we understand that the universe was formed at God’s command, so that what
is seen was not made out of what was visible.” It is also an act of faith to
claim that humanity evolved after a long process.
Exegetes and English-language translators have long struggled with
whether Heb 11:1 should be interpreted as objective or subjective.32 The
translation quoted in the previous paragraph represents the subjective
interpretation.33 A translation representative of the objective interpretation
Unless otherwise indicated, Scripture quotations are from the NIV.
R. L. Brawley, “Discoursive Structure and the Unseen in Hebrews 2:8 and 11:1:
A Neglected Aspect of the Context,” CBQ 55/1 (1993): 97-98.
31
Polanyi, 243. “But whether our confidence in the powers of our comprehension
arises spontaneously from the depth of our inquiring mind or leans on our trust in
the judgment of our teachers, it is always an act of hope akin to the dynamism of all
human faith.”
29
30

32
James D. Smith III, “Faith as Substance or Surety: Historical Perspectives
on Hypostasis in Hebrews 11:1,” in The Challenge of Bible Translation: Communicating
God’s Word to the World: Essays in Honor of Ronald F. Youngblood, ed. Glen G. Scorgie,
Mark L. Strauss, and Steven M. Voth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 381-392.
It has been argued that the objective/subjective distinction broadly conceived was
first systematized during the Enlightenment, most notably by Descartes, and that
this distinction so construed has created an unwarranted disconnect between faith
and reason. See Newbigin, 29-44; James R. Peters, The Logic of the Heart: Augustine,
Pascal, and the Rationality of Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 16-17; Dallas
Willard, Knowing Christ Today: Why We Can Trust Spiritual Knowledge, 1st ed. (New York:
HarperOne, 2009), 23-26.
33
William J. Abraham, “Faith, Assurance, and Conviction: An Epistemological
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reads: “Faith is the reality of what we hope for, the proof of what we don’t
see” (CEB).34 “Confidence” and “assurance” emphasize the knower’s internal
subjective response, while “reality” and “proof ” emphasize the external-mindindependent status of the knowable object. Valid arguments are given for
both interpretations, so let me suggest that because of the ambiguity of the
original Greek in conjunction with the constraints of English as a language,
our understanding of “faith” should expand to include both meanings.
Thus faith brings together both objective reality and proof with subjective
confidence and assurance.
Faith is not needed for beliefs formed through perception, but only
for beliefs formed from testimony. From the perspective of the novice
information seeker, when there are competing accounts, she must evaluate
the authority, corroboration, plausibility, and presentation of the testimony
received. On the creation/evolution question, I suggest that the issue of
authority takes priority, and that it is a commitment on that question that
determines the subsequent outcomes in belief formation. In other words,
faith is prior to knowledge; commitment precedes knowing.35
Conclusion
The standards for the evaluation of information (authority, independent
corroboration, plausibility and support, and presentation, as conventionally
conceived in higher education), thus prove inadequate in and of themselves
to aid the novice information seeker to come to a personal conclusion on
the creation/evolution debate. These standards thus applied do, however,
challenge a naive certainty in either account of human origins because both
accounts find support among credible scientific authorities who competently
present their diverse interpretations of the same verifiable data that reasonably
appear to corroborate and validate the preferred account.
Commentary on Hebrews 11:1,” Ex auditu 19 (2003): 65-75.
34
This translation is argued for by Robert G. Hoerber, “On the Translation of
Hebrews 11:1,” Concordia Journal 21/1 (1995): 77-79.
35
Polanyi argued for this priority in Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical
Philosophy, corrected ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). He further
applied the principle to religious knowing in idem, “Faith and Reason,” 237-247. We
come to know “only by relying on our awareness of numberless particulars, most
of which we could never specify in themselves” (ibid., 245). He concludes his essay
by stating, “Here we have a paradigm of the Pauline scheme of faith, works and
grace. The discoverer works in the belief that his labors will prepare his mind for
receiving a truth from sources over which he has no control. I regard the Pauline
scheme therefore as the only adequate conception of scientific discovery” (ibid., 247).
Building on Polanyi’s work, Newbigin expands and more explicitly applies the priority
of faith in Jesus to knowledge in Proper Confidence.
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It is also within the scope of information-literacy-based critical-thinking
dispositions for the novice information seeker to observe that both sets
of interpretations are arguably derived from presuppositions grounded in
a diverse socially constructed worldview, and thus each claim becomes in
essence a “testimony” to perceived reality as experienced by the interpreter/
interpretive community rather than an objective mind-independent reality.
And so it might be assumed that the equal-validity doctrine inherent in much
of the humanities and social-science discussions applies here. Yet admitting
this is neither intuitive nor “realistic” nor ontologically satisfying.
From these observations, it is suggested that for the novice information
seeker, accepting one account over the other be appreciated as an act of
faith in a given testimony. Therefore, the seeker may need to move beyond
the particulars of the information, and make further interpretive choices
warranted by the credibility and authority of the interpretive community in
its holistic engagement with reality.
It is the experience of many that God as revealed in the Judeo/Christian
Scriptures corresponds to this holistic conception of reality and has been
proven to their satisfaction to be a reliable authority. In a direct challenge to
contemporary scientism, the Hebrew Scriptures reflect this appreciation of
authority by giving voice to the Creator God, “Where were you when I laid
the earth’s foundation? Tell me, if you understand.” (Job 38:4). And in the
Christian Scriptures the Gospel of John affirms it: “In the beginning was the
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God
in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing
was made that has been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of
all mankind.” (John 1:1-4). Given this acceptance of Scriptural testimony to
divine authority for human origins, the appeal for faith enunciated by the
author of Hebrews coherently follows, “And without faith it is impossible
to please God, because anyone who comes to him must believe that he
exists and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him.” (vs. 6). From this
admittedly subjective stance,36 it could be argued that the best evidence for
human origins might be found in the realities of “life” as now experienced
rather than in the data gleaned from the “past,” which usually proves sketchy,
incomplete, and subject to diverse interpretations.

36
Though, I would suggest, no more subjective than the stance underlying the
standard evolutionary account.

